Towards a response to epistemic nihilism by Wright, Jake
Towards a response to epistemic nihilism 
 
Jake Wright, Center for Learning Innovation, University of Minnesota Rochester, 




This chapter develops an account of epistemic nihilism—roughly, the rejection of truth’s 
intrinsic or instrumental value in favor of statements that reject or obscure truth to secure 
an advantage for the speaker—by examining three instances of such nihilism: lying, 
bullshit, and trolling.  It further argues that epistemic nihilism, exacerbated by changes in 
the media landscape, can pose a significant threat to liberal democratic institutions and 
ideals by undermining the democratic ideal of good faith engagement on a level playing 
field, while also encouraging undemocratic actions (e.g., terrorism) among interlocutors 
who take the nihilist’s claims seriously.  Finally, this chapter argues that in extreme cases, 
we are justified in denying epistemic nihilists a platform from which to speak by drawing 
a parallel with vexatious litigant laws that deny individuals the right to petition courts for 
redress on the grounds that abuse of that right results in significant harm to both individuals 
and the legal system itself. 
 




On November 3, 2020, voters elected former Vice President Joe Biden as the 46th President 
of the United States, defeating incumbent Donald Trump.  Because the election took place 
amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, over 100 million voters—an unprecedented number—
voted early.  This tsunami of early voting had a number of effects, including delayed vote-
counting in the decisive states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Georgia.  This 
delay meant that news organizations were unable to project a winner until the morning of 
November 7th (Edelman 2020a) and that the final states of Georgia and North Carolina 
were not projected until November 13th, a full ten days after Election Day (Edelman 
2020b).  Such a delay was similarly unprecedented,1 since election winners are typically 
 
1 The closest modern parallel to the 2020 vote count is the 2000 presidential election, which was not 
resolved for over a month because of a miniscule margin in the ultimately decisive state of Florida.  
Following a series of recounts and legal challenges, George W. Bush was declared the winner by a 
known on election night.  Further, because of partisan messaging regarding the safety of 
early voting and the manner in which votes were cast,2 several states that contributed to 
Biden’s victory initially showed a significant lead for Trump that would later be chipped 
away at and ultimately surpassed by votes for Biden (Bronner, Wiederkehr, and Rakich 
2020). 
As a result of the delayed vote count and the marked shift towards Biden as early 
votes were tabulated, several right wing social media accounts pushed widespread 
narratives of voter fraud, leading to significant doubts about the fairness of the election and 
the validity of Biden’s victory, especially among Republicans (Badger 2020; Mehta 2020).  
For example, in the three weeks following Election Day, Twitter flagged tweets from 
Donald Trump’s account (@realDonaldTrump) over 200 times as containing false 
information about the election (Spangler 2020).  These baseless accusations potentially 
undermine not only the perceived legitimacy of a Biden administration, but also faith in 
future elections. 
Liberal democracy depends on good faith engagement.  For example, democratic 
institutions must be responsive to stakeholders’ needs via a ‘process of reasoned discussion 
and deliberation on equal footing’ (Christiano 2018).  As Mill notes, ‘the rights and 
interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person 
 
margin of 529 votes after the United States Supreme Court ordered an end to the recount in mid-
December. 
2 Republicans, led by Donald Trump, largely tried to paint early voting as insecure and a source of 
widespread voter fraud, while Democrats encouraged early voting as a safe way to vote amidst a 
pandemic (Silver 2020).  Thus, while early voting typically does not show a partisan lean in the United 
States, the early vote in 2020 skewed heavily towards Democrats.  Further, in many states, in-person 
votes are tabulated first, with early votes counted later.  Such states, like Pennsylvania and Georgia, 
showed an initial ‘red mirage’ due to Trump’s significant lead in votes cast on election day itself.  By 
contrast, states like Ohio and Texas, which counted early votes first, created a ‘blue mirage’ because the 
vote counting was reversed relative to states like Pennsylvania and Georgia. 
interested is himself able, and habitually disposed to stand up for them’ (1861: 54).  In 
short, the ideal of democracy involves participation by individuals who are forthright about 
their interests via good faith engagement on a level playing field.  The further we slip from 
this ideal, the worse democracy operates—potentially to the point of a complete breakdown 
of democratic systems themselves.  Efforts like those above, baselessly painting the 
legitimate winner of a presidential election as fraudulent are, simply put, not good faith 
engagement, and it is not hard to see how such efforts and the degree to which they have 
been advanced constitute a threat to democratic processes and institutions. 
Recent scholarship has focused on rhetorical efforts to undermine the democratic 
process belying a commitment to good faith engagement, such as bullshitting and trolling.  
While efforts have been made to address such phenomena, they have largely focused on 
the individual phenomena themselves—for example, how we can disabuse belief in bullshit 
(Wright 2020a) or counter trollish behavior (Ebner 2019)—rather than considering these 
phenomena under a broader, more unified umbrella.   
I have noted elsewhere that parallels existing between these phenomena are 
‘instructive and worthy of further study’ (Wright 2020b) both because of their shared 
similarities as phenomena and because of the shared threats they collectively pose to 
democratic institutions.  This chapter represents a first step in that further study, outlining 
what I term epistemic nihilism—briefly, a worldview that rejects the intrinsic value of 
truth—and outlining how we ought to respond to extreme cases of such nihilism.  
Essentially, cases of epistemic nihilism depend on rejecting truth as a necessary condition 
for achieving one’s aims, often depending on one’s interlocutor being unaware of this 
rejection.  Thus, when deployed in the context of the democratic process, such actions 
constitute a form of cheating where one does not engage in good faith, creating an 
advantage precisely because one expects one’s interlocutor to be engaging in the good faith 
that the epistemic nihilist has rejected. 
The question thus becomes how we ought to respond to cases of epistemic nihilism.  
While a number of remedies exist to address one-off instances of nihilism—for example, 
the ability on many social media platforms to flag nihilistic posts for removal or as 
disputed—the question of how to respond becomes more challenging when considering 
serial offenders whose nihilism becomes something of a way of life.  Put differently, we 
must consider what to do with, for example, serial liars, inveterate bullshitters, and 
unrepentant trolls who do not merely engage in nihilistic behavior but are properly 
considered epistemic nihilists.  I argue that, in such extreme cases, we are justified in 
denying the nihilist a platform from which to speak. 
Such a response is, in some sense, extreme, seeming to violate norms of discourse 
at a minimum and potentially violating rights to free speech at a maximum.  I argue that 
such an extreme response is warranted when it is only through our ability to enforce such 
penalties that the nihilist’s advantage can be countered, drawing a parallel with the legal 
designation of vexatious litigants, who are barred from petitioning the courts—despite the 
right to do so—specifically because the harm created by the vexatious litigant’s abuse of 
that right.  Put slightly differently, an epistemic nihilist like Trump might have the right to 
free expression under normal circumstances, but the abuse of that right to cause significant, 
repeated harm to democratic institutions may justify actions like denying a platform from 
which he can make his claims. 
 
Epistemic nihilism 
I take epistemic nihilism to be the rejection of truth as an intrinsic or instrumental good.  
Often, discussions employing the term focus on at least the view that knowledge via 
universal epistemic principles is unobtainable,3 sometimes accompanied by further 
claims—for example, Nietzsche’s claim that knowledge would not be useful if it were 
obtainable (Nehamas 2010) or Rorty’s claim that epistemology as an enterprise is fatally 
flawed and should be dismantled (2009).  When I use the term epistemic nihilism, however, 
I do not mean to suggest cases where a speaker believes that truth is unobtainable or cannot 
be adjudicated using universal principles, and I take epistemology generally to be a fruitful 
endeavor.  Further, though I will not argue for it here, I accept a correspondence view of 
truth that accepts claims as true insofar as they align with an actual state of affairs in the 
world. 
Perhaps the closest use of the term to my own is Arendt’s view of nihilism as ‘a 
way of thinking that can look rational but is really an attack on the purpose of rationality’ 
(Gertz 2019: 104).  As I discuss cases of epistemic nihilism, a common thread that emerges 
is the obscurance of truth because the truth is not valuable to the speaker who is attempting 
to influence their interlocutor’s rational deliberations.  This section examines such nihilism 
by considering the similarities between three exemplars of nihilistic speech—lying, 
bullshitting, and trolling—as well as the advantages of viewing activities like these as 
tokens of a larger type.  I also discuss how epistemic nihilism can transcend individual 
instances and become an identity or way of life, which has implications for how we ought 
to respond when combatting extreme cases of such nihilism. 
 
3 See, for example, Goldman (2010). 
It takes no great imagination to see how lying constitutes epistemic nihilism.  The 
goal of a lie is to convince one’s interlocutor to believe a falsehood spoken by the liar 
because their belief in that falsehood would advantage the speaker in some way.  For 
example, one may lie and deny an extramarital affair, but such a lie would only be 
successful if the interlocutor (e.g., the speaker’s spouse) believed the lie and presumably 
would be uttered only if the speaker viewed it as to their advantage.  Even white lies—for 
example, the claim that dinner was delicious when it was not or that one’s dress is attractive 
when it is not—advantage the speaker at some level, for example by allowing the speaker 
to seem supportive or to grease the wheels of social cohesion.  Thus, the lie requires the 
recognition that the value of truth is outstripped by the value obtained by others’ belief in 
one’s falsehood. 
Bullshit similarly rejects the value of truth, though for somewhat different reasons.  
Bullshit is essentially a claim that the speaker wishes their interlocutor to believe, though 
the speaker themselves has no regard for the claim’s truth value (Frankfurt 1986).  For 
example, Donald Trump regularly claims that unflattering coverage such as reports 
regarding crowd size (Concha 2018; Dale 2019; Levine 2019; O’Neil 2019), his handling 
of the Covid-19 pandemic (Trump 2020c), and his reelection campaign (Trump 2020b) is 
‘fake news.’ 
As I have argued previously (Wright 2020a), Trump’s claims are bullshit precisely 
because of his aim in expressing them.  Some cries of fake news are accurate, while others 
are not; Trump desires his audience to believe him not because they are true or false, but 
because they are unflattering.  Unlike the lie, where truth matters, the truth value of the 
bullshitter’s claim is simply irrelevant. 
As a third example, trolling differs from lying and bullshitting in that success 
depends not on the interlocutor believing the troll, but rather because the interlocutor is 
unsure what to believe because it is unclear what the troll believes.  Essentially, trolling is 
a behavior in which outlandish claims are made or actions are undertaken for the purpose 
of garnering a reaction (Buckels, Trapnell, and Paulhus 2014; Edstrom 2016).  Often, 
though not universally, such activities are otherwise aimless (Shachaf and Hara 2010), 
resulting merely from a desire to disrupt (Hardaker 2010).  As noted later in this chapter, 
the generally aimless nature of most trolling provides vital cover for more nefarious 
instances of trolling that seek to disrupt in order to achieve a particular aim, like 
mainstreaming extremist views, retreating to familiar trollish responses that their actions 
are unserious and ought to be taken as such. 
The generally provocative aim of trolling provides crucial cover for cases where 
trolling is employed as a recruiting or persuasive tool.  For example, trolling often involves 
a ‘humorous ambiguity [that] offers access points for undecided and not-yet politicized 
users to develop affinities with and support for far-right causes’ (Bogerts and Fielitz 2019: 
151)  Such ambiguity allows the troll ‘ironic distance’ (May and Feldman 2019: 26) when 
the troll is confronted with claims that their speech or actions are out-of-bounds.  Indeed, 
trolls typically respond that they are, in Internet parlance, ‘doing it for the lulz,’4 suggesting 
that their actions or speech ought not be taken seriously because they seek to provoke.  This 
idea of doing it for the lulz suggests that there is something wrong with the interlocutor 
 
4 ‘Lulz’ is a transformation of the common chat/text acronym LOL (laugh out loud), frequently deployed 
when the goal is to generate laughter based on offensive or provocative behavior.  For example, 
UrbanDictionary.com lists several user-provided definitions with examples, including ‘Why did I post a 
giant image of 50 Hitlers? I did it for the lulz,’ or claiming that Truman authorized the atomic bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing ‘thousands of innocent women and children… for the lulz’ (Urban 
Dictionary n.d.) 
themselves because they took trolling at face value, rather than embracing the ‘nothing 
matters’ ethos of trolling (Wright 2020b). 
 
A unified theory of epistemic nihilism 
 
There are important differences between lying, bullshitting, and trolling, such as whether 
their success depends on the interlocutor believing a false claim or whether the interlocutor 
must believe the speaker is representing genuinely held views.  Further, significant 
literature exists discussing how to address each activity individually, ranging from 
innumerable discussions of dishonesty in various subfields of applied ethics to discussions 
of the psychological motivations behind bullshit acceptance5—as well as how to counter 
such openness6—to strategies for countering trollish behavior.7 
It is not my goal to suggest that nothing can be learned by such focused attention.  
Instead, I suggest that grouping nihilistic activities under a common umbrella also carries 
with it certain advantages.  First, approaching the problem through a common lens allows 
us to note similarities between actions that abandon truth as useful or intrinsically good.  
Second, insofar as commonalities exist, we are better positioned to develop general 
strategies and apply extant strategies focused on one token of this type.  Third, grouping 
actions under a common banner allows us to sidestep questions of taxonomy when such 
questions are not useful.  We need not parse whether a difficult case is a lie, bullshit, 
 
5 See, for example, Nyhan and Reifler (2010); Pennycook and Rand (2018); Prior, Sood, and Khanna 
(2015); Schaffner and Luks (2018); and Wood and Porter. (2019) 
6 See, for example, Andre (1983), Delaney (2004), Erion (2005), Momeyer (1995), Paden (1987, 1994), Satris 
(1986), and Wright (2019) for discussions of how to combat bullshit in a classroom environment. 
7 See, for example, Bogerts and Fielitz (2019), Ebner (2019), Edstrom (2016), May and Feldman (2019), and 
Tuters (2019). 
trolling, or something else if little rides on such a distinction; we may simply note an 
instance of epistemic nihilism and respond accordingly. 
Many of the similarities between activities like lying, bullshitting, and trolling 
have been noted above.  Briefly, each activity depends on rejecting the value or utility of 
truth in order to achieve some further aim by, for example, inducing one’s interlocutor to 
believe a particular claim or to obscure the speaker’s true beliefs or intent.  Recognizing 
such similarities allows us to examine other behaviors with a critical eye towards whether 
they, too, constitute cases of epistemic nihilism.  For example, one may examine the naïve 
skepticism often expressed by introductory-level students as a kind of (well-intentioned) 
nihilism that results from students’ desires to avoid offense or appear tolerant (Wright 
2019).  Similarly, one might recognize that there are cases, like those discussed below, 
where one can engage in nihilism despite total transparency about one’s genuine beliefs 
because the beliefs themselves are obviously nihilistic. 
By collecting such disparate activities under a common framework, we can not 
only consider common responses—like my proposed response in this chapter—that may 
apply across all forms of epistemic nihilism, but also consider how particular targeted 
responses may be appropriated to respond to other forms of nihilism.  For example, I have 
discussed how strategies for addressing naïve skepticism can be reapplied to combat 
people’s openness to political bullshit (Wright 2020a).  Certainly, there will not be perfect 
overlap in such cases, and differences between kinds of nihilism ought to be taken into 
account, but this is not, I take it, a reason to reject such considerations any more than being 
sensitive to the relevant details of a particular instance of bullshit is a reason to reject 
general anti-bullshit strategies.  One may look for broad trends and general strategies while 
attending to the details of a particular case. 
 
Indeed, there may be instances where working in broad strokes is preferable to a fine-
grained analysis.  Such cases illustrate the third advantage of a broad theory of epistemic 
nihilism—the ability to sidestep irrelevant detail.  To see what I mean, consider the 
following cases: 
During racial justice protests in Buffalo, New York, an elderly peace activist named 
Martin Gugino was pushed to the ground by Buffalo police officers, hitting his head on the 
concrete sidewalk and sustaining a brain injury.  Gugino’s case attracted widespread media 
attention because video of the incident demonstrated that the officers’ actions were 
unprovoked and directly contradicted an initial statement from the police department that 
Gugino ‘was injured when he tripped & fell’ (Herbert 2020).  Donald Trump responded to 
this incident by suggesting via tweet that Gugino was a member of antifa8 who had faked 
injury (Trump 2020a).  Trump’s tweet immediately drew widespread condemnation as 
‘baseless’ (Spencer and Farley 2020), ‘without evidence’ (Phelps and Cathey 2020), a 
‘conspiracy theory’ (Kessler 2020; Phelps and Cathey 2020; Reuters Staff 2020) and 
‘outrageous’ (Kessler 2020).  Because a Republican Senate conference lunch was 
scheduled for the afternoon Trump tweeted his comments, Republican senators became 
obvious media targets for journalists in search of comment. One such senator was Ron 
Johnson, who initially claimed to have not seen the tweet in question.  But when asked by 
 
8 Antifa is an umbrella term for a loose collection of left-wing protestors formed in the wake of white 
supremacy protests in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017 (Who are Antifa? n.d.) The term itself is a 
portmanteau of ‘anti-fascist’. 
a reporter if he would like to have the tweet read to him so that he might comment, Johnson 
responded, ‘I would rather not hear it’ (Raju, Foran, and Fox 2020).  
One might wonder how to classify such a comment, where the clear implication is 
a desire to avoid knowing the truth.  The plain meaning of ‘I would rather not know’ is a 
desire to not know rather than a desire to wait for context or a request for time to formulate 
a response.  By saying he would rather not hear Trump’s comment, Johnson is not lying; 
he genuinely did not want to know what Trump said.  Neither was his comment bullshit, 
since the truth of Johnson’s claim seems central to our analysis.  Finally, it is not trolling, 
since there is no evidence Johnson made his remarks to get a rise out of reporters, In 
addition, there is no doubt about his genuine view.  Yet his actions seem almost brazenly 
nihilistic; he simply declares he does not want to know the truth because the truth would 
be, in some sense, bad for him.   
One might, out of a sense of charity, argue that Johnson may have demurred out of 
a wish to avoid commenting without knowledge of the full context.  Even if we apply such 
strenuous credulity, however, Johnson’s comment is a particularly overt instance of a 
pattern among Republican politicians who refuse to contradict obviously false, malicious 
statements by Trump to the point where ‘Republicans asked about Trump’s comments on 
x’ has become something of a journalistic genre.  Thus, it is instructive to consider a second 
example where, in response to Trump’s baseless claims that he won the 2020 election and 
is the victim of widespread fraud, each Republican member of Congress was asked, one 
month after the election, who won the 2020 Presidential election.  Out of 249 Republican 
members, 27 acknowledged former Vice President Joe Biden as the winner, two claimed 
that Trump had indeed won, and 220 refused to answer (Kane and Clement 2020).  Like 
the Gugino case, Trump’s false claims to be the victim of fraud are dangerous, but unlike 
the Gugino case, unfamiliarity with the issue is simply impossible, rather than seemingly 
implausible, since the question was posed a month after the election itself, after a clear 
winner had emerged. Yet again, it is not clear that those who refused to answer lied, 
bullshitted, or engaged in trolling. 
Classifying such cases as instances of epistemic nihilism affords those of us who 
stand opposed to such behavior the opportunity to name it without having to more precisely 
diagnose or taxonomize.  Insofar as labeling such remarks as instances of nihilism is 
sufficient in considering a response, further analysis is unnecessary.  It is nihilism and 
ought to be treated as such. 
 
Epistemic nihilism as a worldview 
Thus far, discussion of epistemic nihilism has focused on individual cases in order to 
provide a sense of what sorts of actions constitute epistemic nihilism.  However, it is 
important to note there is a difference between one-off instances and serial commission.  
For many of the actions that constitute epistemic nihilism, one common thread seems to be 
that repeated instances of such actions can impact one’s identity through how one is 
perceived by others or how one perceives oneself.  For example, we may judge one who 
lies regularly as a liar.  ‘Internet troll’ is not merely pejorative; it can also be part of one’s 
self identity, used to enforce community boundaries among fellow trolls (Bartlett 2014) or 
as justification for one’s socially undesirable actions (Reed 2019).   
If we take seriously the idea that repeated instances of particular forms of epistemic 
nihilism can result in identities like ‘liar,’ ‘bullshitter,’ or ‘troll’ either being assigned or 
self-declared, it seems one can similarly be an epistemic nihilist, full stop.  It may be 
sufficient to note that an individual simply is an epistemic nihilist.  Such labeling may be 
useful, both in terms of pushing back on more nuanced denials of being a liar, etc., but also 
because such labels have important implications for how we ought to respond in 
particularly egregious cases, as I discuss below.  We may be justified in enforcing stricter 
penalties against a liar than one who lies occasionally, and we may be similarly justified 
enforcing strict penalties against epistemic nihilists.  Before discussing how we ought to 
respond, however, it is worth discussing in some detail the threat posed by nihilistic 
behavior. 
 
The threat of epistemic nihilism 
Liberal democracy is premised on active, good faith participation from forthright members 
of the community, which provides a more-or-less level playing field.  Epistemic nihilism 
rejects this premise by abusing the assumption that interlocutors are engaging in good faith.  
When successful, such actions advantage nihilistic behavior.  In addition to providing a 
rhetorical advantage that is the direct result of bad faith engagement, nihilism has the 
further deleterious effect of encouraging conspiracists and other fringe actors willing to 
engage in actions well outside the scope of normal democratic participation.  These 
advantages are further exacerbated by a balkanized media landscape that favors consumers’ 
own partisan or tribal preferences, creating environments where nihilism is not adequately 
confronted. 
 
The nihilist’s rhetorical advantage 
 
It seems obvious that epistemic nihilism is advantaged over a commitment to truth and 
accuracy, since nihilistic speech need only be rhetorically advantageous, while truthful or 
accurate speech much also attend to those criteria.  For example, the ironic distance 
provided by nihilistic acts like trolling allow an ambiguity that advantages the speaker by 
allowing a response to claims that one’s speech is racist, misogynistic, and so forth along 
the lines that the speaker is only kidding or being provocative for provocation’s sake, 
masking the speaker’s seriousness with unseriousness (Bogerts and Fielitz 2019).  
Essentially, nihilistic speech need not reveal itself as such unless pressed, so potential 
fellow travelers who view such speech favorably gain access to the views expressed 
because opponents cannot clearly establish that the views are sincerely held by the speaker 
(May and Feldman 2019). 
Nihilistic speech similarly advantages the speaker when the context of discussion 
drifts from sincerely held beliefs towards meta-discussion of the speaker’s seriousness.  
There may be widespread agreement that sincerely believing a particular claim would be 
problematic.  But the ironic distance provided by seemingly unserious provocation leads 
not to a discussion of the view itself, but whether the view is sincerely held or whether it 
is acceptable to insincerely express the view in question.  When such debate occurs, the 
ironic or unserious use of language expressing genuinely held beliefs communicates 
meaning to those who understand the rules of a particular form of nihilistic communication 
as a form of dog whistle (Tuters 2019).  The farcical nature of claims that Joe Biden’s 
electoral victory was fraudulent has led to a robust meta-discussion of the degree to which 
these claims are genuinely held (Rucker, Dawsey, and Parker 2020), distracting from the 
fact that they are damaging precisely because they are false.  Meanwhile, the message to 
those ‘in the know’ is quite clear; despite a clear victory free of fraud or interference, Joe 
Biden is not to be viewed as a legitimate president. 
Finally, nihilistic speech allows for deflection or avoidance of undesirable lines of 
inquiry.  Donald Trump, for example, has avoided questions about his rhetoric’s effect on 
white nationalists by arguing such questions are themselves ‘racist’ (Farhi 2018).  
Similarly, he refused to answer a question about the removal of a high-ranking public 
health official who contradicted Trump’s unsubstantiated claims about an ineffective 
Covid-19 treatment on the grounds that the reporter who asked the question was from a 
‘fake news’ organization (Cortright 2020).  Ron Johnson refused to hear what Trump had 
to say about the Gugino case.  Like Trump’s claims that his electoral defeat was the result 
of fraud, these cases drew media scrutiny away from the substance of the claims towards a 
general refusal to answer (Lewandowsky, Jetter, and Ecker Forthcoming).   
Refusing to engage on specious grounds to avoid uncomfortable or unflattering 
lines of inquiry obscures what one believes, as well as why they believe it.  At best, we as 
interlocutors are able to evaluate actions and motivations at a meta level, judging them for 
their willingness to obfuscate and engage in nihilistic behavior, rather than evaluate actions 
in their own right.  We may, perhaps, infer certain things from how someone responds to 
certain questions, but inference is no substitute for a genuine answer. 
 
The dangers of nihilistic speech 
In addition to providing a rhetorical advantage, nihilistic speech can encourage actions that 
are anathema to reasoned deliberation that is the ideal of democracy.  While the nihilist 
themselves might not be concerned with the truth, their interlocutors often are, thus creating 
the possibility of such individuals accepting genuinely dangerous claims. 
For example, public health efforts aimed at reducing the spread of Covid-19 have 
been implemented to varying degrees of success globally.  One of the largest factors 
impacting success is the degree to which they are countered by what the World Health 
Organization has called an ‘infodemic’ of misinformation (Evanega et al. n.d.; United 
Nations Department of Global Communications 2020).  In the United States, preliminary 
analysis has found that the largest driver of misinformation has been Donald Trump himself 
(Evanega et al. n.d.).  37.9% of all misinformation captured by the study were directly 
associated with Trump, and a ‘substantial proportion—possibly even the majority—of the 
[discussion surrounding] “miracle cures”’ (7) may have been driven by Trump as well, 
since he frequently touted supposed cures like hydroxychloroquine and injecting bleach.  
Such misinformation is not a theoretical exercise; it impacts individuals’ view of the 
pandemic itself and the trustworthiness of genuine sources of medical knowledge.  Partisan 
differences regarding the seriousness of the pandemic and the efficacy of preventative 
measures exist (Allcott et al. 2020) and can reasonably be explained, at least in part, by the 
fact that a major American political party is led by an epistemic nihilist. 
The threat posed by nihilistic speech goes beyond public health, however, 
promoting actions that directly threaten the pillars of liberal democratic institutions.  
Adherents to QAnon—the conspiracy theory that Donald Trump is overseeing a federal 
investigation into Satan-worshiping, blood-drinking, cannibalistic Democratic Party 
leaders (including and especially 2016 nominee Hillary Clinton) and Hollywood celebrities 
who are collectively responsible for a global child sex trafficking ring (Neiwert 2018)—
anxiously await the ‘Storm,’ supposed coordinated raids intended to crack down on the 
cabal (Coaston 2019).  QAnon’s growth has occurred on the far right with ‘surprising 
rapidity’ (Neiwert 2018), and a number of 2020 electoral candidates endorsed the theory 
either tacitly or explicitly.  This includes Marjorie Taylor Greene, whose election to 
represent Georgia’s 14th district elevated an explicit adherent to the House of 
Representatives (Allam 2020).  Following a congratulatory tweet to Greene after her 
victory in the Georgia primary, Donald Trump was asked whether he endorsed QAnon.  
Refusing to denounce the theory, he replied that he ‘didn’t know anything about them, 
other than they supposedly like me,’ and that ‘if I can help them save the world from 
problems, I’m willing to do it’ (Rogers and Roose 2020). 
It is not hard to imagine how such failure to denounce a conspiracy by its supposed 
leader can be viewed as at least tacit approval by conspiracists.  Again, such seeming 
endorsement is no theoretical exercise; adherents have been described by the FBI as 
individuals willing to ‘commit criminal and sometimes violent activity’ (FBI Phoenix Field 
Office 2019: 1), and have, in fact, done so.  QAnon conspiracists, along with adherents to 
QAnon’s progenitor, Pizzagate, have attempted armed liberations of nonexistent 
trafficking victims, blocked traffic with an armored truck to force the release of 
nonexistent, supposedly confirmatory documents, and assassinated a member of the New 
York mafia because the crime boss was a purported member of the so-called ‘deep state’ 
conspiring against Trump (Amarasingam and Argentino 2020).   In the latter case, the 
mafia assassin’s lawyer reported that he viewed himself as ‘Trump’s chosen vigilante’  
(Amarasingam and Argentino 2020: 40). 
Such violence, generally speaking, is a breakdown of the sort of discourse 
democracy depends on; it is the application of power in lieu of reasoned discussion and 
deliberation.  Thus, any violence is, at some level, problematic for democracy.  But when 
such violence is cloaked in extrajudicial actions where conspiracist actors believe they have 
the tacit approval of the president, such violence becomes a threat to democracy itself.  It 
does not matter whether the speaker actually believes in the underlying conspiracy theory.  
The refusal to say that a conspiracy theory is just that, instead remarking that one is ‘willing 
to [help],’ gives conspiracists permission to operate and act in a way that undermines 
democracy via terrorism and other actions anathema to democracy. 
 
The media’s effect on epistemic nihilism 
Though the examples used throughout this chapter are recent, epistemic nihilism and its 
dangers are not new.  Conspiracists have acted against the state long before the advent of 
24-hour news, Tokyo Rose did not require the Internet to spread propaganda, and Socrates 
decried the rhetorical advantage of sophistry9 over two millennia ago.  What has changed, 
though, is a media landscape which exacerbates the advantages of and dangers posed by 
epistemic nihilism.  This change is the result of what Rose and Bartoli (2020) call the 
‘balkanization’ of media, where previously hegemonic media structures like local and 
national newspapers or television networks are supplanted by an explosion of new 
journalistic and quasi-journalistic sources, reflecting both consumers’ own partisan 
preferences and the shift towards so-called viral content.   
 
9 See, especially, the dialogues Sophist, Gorgias, and Protagoras. John M. Cooper describes the Socratic view 
thusly: ‘Though aware that he does not know anything, [the sophist] produces in words totally inadequate 
“copies” of the truth on important subjects, one he makes appear to others to be the truth, even though, 
being false, they are hardly even like it.' (Cooper 1997: 326) 
Such balkanization can invite nihilism not only by catering to cognitive biases like 
motivated reasoning or intellectual laziness, but also because new media outlets often favor 
the enforcement of tribal boundaries over a commitment to truthfulness.  For example, the 
conservative Gateway Pundit claims that they ‘report the truth—and leave the Russia-
Collusion fairy tale to the Conspiracy media’ [sic] (Hoft n.d.).  The conservative Daily 
Caller’s Twitter bio brands itself as ‘[t]he journalists who love America’ (@DailyCaller 
n.d.).  Fox News successfully defended itself and its highest-rated host, Tucker Carlson, in 
a defamation lawsuit by arguing that the substance—not the expressed opinions, but the 
substance—of Carlson’s commentary ‘cannot reasonably be interpreted as facts’ 
(Vyskockil 2020: 5) because ‘given Mr. Carlson’s reputation, any reasonable viewer 
“arrive[s] with an appropriate amount of skepticism” about the statements he makes’ (12).   
In an environment where the epistemic nihilist seeks the cover of ambiguity to mask 
their beliefs or seeks to mainstream their beliefs by introducing them through seemingly 
respectable outlets in palatable forms, media balkanization is a godsend.  As noted 
previously, ambiguity offers a powerful opportunity to introduce extremist ideologies, and 
mainstreaming can be easily bootstrapped in a media ecosystem of innumerable outlets.  
This is especially true when options include hyperpartisan outlets, as well as outlets 
committed to fastidiously presenting both sides of an argument, regardless of how 
supported the evidence for both sides is.   
In the latter case, media’s provision of so-called ‘false balance’ not only provides 
avenues for unsupported contrarian opinions, but also obscures the degree to which genuine 
expert consensus exists on phenomena like climate change (Koehler 2016; Merkley 2020; 
Park 2018).  For example, a significant driver of the Covid-19 infodemic seems to have 
been that the overwhelming majority of Trump’s baseless claims were not presented in a 
context where fact checking took place (Evanega et al. n.d.), obscuring the degree to which 
expert consensus was aligned against Trump’s unfounded claims, creating an environment 
where Trump’s claims seemed more reasonable than they objectively were.   
 
Countering epistemic nihilism 
Given the threats posed by epistemic nihilism, one might naturally ask how we ought to 
respond.  Here, I argue that we must be willing, in extreme cases, to deny epistemic nihilists 
a platform from which to speak, similar to how vexatious litigants are denied the ability to 
seek relief from the courts.  In both cases, denial seems to at least violate fundamental 
norms and may involve curtailing an individual’s rights.  Like the vexatious litigant, I argue 
that the epistemic nihilist may be denied a platform even though doing so may curtail free 
speech rights precisely because the way in which those rights are invoked are abusive and 
harmful. 
Nihilistic speech succeeds because it is able to subvert the norms of democratic 
discourse that assume a level of good faith and honest representation of sincerely held 
views, for example, convincing interlocutors that insincere views are held sincerely, or 
masking sincerely held views behind a veil of ambiguity.  Efforts to counter such speech 
face a trilemma, either (a) stooping to the level of the nihilist by employing nihilistic tactics, 
(b) using established norms to counter the nihilist, or (c) breaking established norms of 
discourse without resorting to nihilistic speech. 
Embracing nihilism to overcome the nihilist is, I take it, a nonstarter.  It may have 
the proximate effect of overcoming a particular instance of nihilistic speech, but the 
ultimate effect is a universal descent into nihilism.  Surely the cure cannot be more of what 
ails us? 
Ideally, nihilistic speech would be countered by employing strategies falling within 
established norms.  For example, social medial platforms have begun applying tools meant 
to counter nihilistic behavior—like fact-checking, flagging, and post removal—more 
widely and evenly than in the past, going so far as to flag and remove posts made by 
political leaders, such as Facebook’s and Twitter’s removal of posts from Donald Trump 
claiming seasonal flu was more dangerous than Covid-19 (O’Sullivan 2020) or Twitter’s 
flagging false and misleading claims about voter fraud and other issues with the tag, “This 
claim about election fraud is disputed” (Romm 2020).  Such actions are the result of the 
claims at issue being both false and dangerous.   
It would be best if the nihilist could be countered by such tactics, but it also seems 
reasonable to assume that staying within established norms of discourse will not always be 
successful precisely because of the advantages afforded nihilistic speech.  Thus, there may 
be cases where one has no choice but to break established norms in an attempt to counter 
epistemic nihilism.  The question is how best to do so, especially in edge cases where the 
nihilist’s behavior is particularly egregious.   
In extreme cases, the epistemic nihilist is essentially weaponizing the right to speak 
by abusing the assumption that interlocutors are operating in good faith.  If this is so, we 
must be willing to deny the nihilist a platform.  Nihilistic politicians, for example, ought 
not have their remarks broadcast, nor should they be the subject of interviews.  Social 
media platforms must be willing to ban nihilists outright if other strategies prove 
unsuccessful.  Obviously, such a strategy raises a number of concerns, from effectiveness 
to the rights of the nihilist to speak.  There may be a public interest in knowing how a 
political figure explains policies, even if they do so nihilistically.  Platform denial may be 
abused via partisan appeals to ‘obvious’ or ‘widely accepted’ truths that are genuinely 
disputed.  Though space prevents a robust defense of each of these important concerns, I 
do note the following. 
First, I acknowledge that attempts to ban lesser-known nihilists can result in a sort 
of whack-a-mole where the offending individual simply registers another account.  
Banning John Smith may not be as effective as banning Donald Trump, in part because of 
Trump’s notoriety.  However, I note that any roadblock that potentially slows or 
discourages nihilistic speech may be valuable.  Also, John Smith cases seem unlikely to be 
the main focus of extreme measures like platform denial, since the potential harm of such 
anonymous actors seems far less likely to reach the point where extreme measures are 
warranted. 
Second, I grant that the public right to know is vital to a healthy democracy and 
political leaders should generally be encouraged to explain their actions.  However, the 
good faith assumed by such encouragement is precisely what the nihilist seeks to exploit 
to their advantage.  Denying nihilists a platform not only neutralizes this advantage, but 
also potentially incentivizes good behavior; a platform may welcome back a sufficiently 
reformed or repentant nihilist.  Nihilists who depend at some level on being well-known—
like politicians or media commentators—will not have the option of simply registering a 
new account and may be forced to choose between their nihilism and their access to a 
ready-made audience. 
Third, the decision to deny a platform to an epistemic nihilist is clearly value-laden.  
We deny nihilists a platform because their nihilism is dangerous (i.e., bad).  Such value 
judgments risk smuggling in more problematic judgments, like denying a speaker a 
platform because their political views do not align with my own.  Though such concerns 
are serious, a basic response can be offered by invoking Heather Douglas’s (2009) 
distinction between the direct and indirect application of values in the decision-making 
process.  While me may use our values to directly determine what sorts of actions are 
permissible—for example, the permissibility of denying a platform based on our values 
regarding liberal democracy—we may not use our values to directly determine what counts 
as an instance of permissible or impermissible action.  Instead, we may use our values to 
indirectly inform how evidence in difficult cases ought to be evaluated.  For example, it 
may be the case that one political party is more likely to engage in nihilistic behavior than 
another, and we may look more skeptically on the claims of that party as a result.  But we 
may not simply say, ‘They are Tories and are therefore denied a platform because I disagree 
with Tories.’  On Douglas’s view, we may rule out advocacy via epistemic nihilism in the 
same way we rule out human subject trials that do not obtain informed consent; our values 
as a society directly tell us that such efforts are impermissible.  (Indeed, it is precisely the 
fact that such values ought to be forthrightly and openly deliberated upon that gives this 
discussion import.)  But we cannot judge that a particular claim is an instance of nihilism 
or that a particular speaker is a nihilist simply because of their political views. 
Finally, denying a platform does not constitute a violation of free speech rights.  In 
the first place, my proposal does not call for imprisoning nihilists, nor am I arguing that 
the positions held by nihilists are automatically out-of-bounds.  Instead, I argue we ought 
not provide platforms to egregious nihilists because of their tactics.  If they wish to argue 
honestly for odious views, this discussion has nothing to say on the matter.  Further, the 
denial of a platform is not speech prevention; it is at best an effort to curtail the reach of 
nihilistic speech to be heard.  But the right to speak does not entail a right to be heard, an 
obligation to listen, or any obligation to amplify a speaker’s message.  In essence, it is a 
declaration that we collectively will not help nihilistic speech find an audience.  If the 
speaker can find an audience or a fringe platform willing to countenance nihilism, that is 
their business.  But even if denying a platform involved curtailing the right to speak, there 
are analogous circumstances demonstrating why such action is justifiable. 
Within the U.S. legal system, as in many liberal democracies, individuals have a 
fundamental right to petition the courts to seek redress.  Yet, there exist individuals who 
invoke this right to the point of abuse, using the system ‘to harass [opponents], to postpone 
a result he considers unfair, or simply to satisfy some urge to engage in litigation’ (Manwell 
1966: 1770).  Such litigants are harmful not only because of the harm they cause their legal 
opponents, but also the harm they cause the legal system itself by overtaxing it and 
preventing or delaying justice for petitioners whose motives are genuine.  Thus, regular 
abusers may be legally declared vexatious litigants and prevented from filing further legal 
claims without involving outside counsel10 or the express permission of the courts.11 
Two features of this designation are worth discussing here.  First, a finding that one 
is a vexatious litigant goes beyond other measures intended to prevent frivolous lawsuits, 
 
10 Vexatious litigants frequently represent themselves, and a requirement to obtain outside counsel 
discourages abuse because such counsel is equally subject to sanction if they themselves abuse the 
courts.  As practicing lawyers whose livelihood depends on access to the legal system, they presumably 
do not wish such sanction. 
11 See, for example, California’s vexatious litigant statutes (Title 3A: Vexatious Litigants 1963.) 
like anti-SLAPP12 laws.  It is an extreme response reserved for extreme offenders.  Second, 
the bar that must be cleared for such a declaration is quite high, involving ‘situations where 
litigants have filed dozens of motions either during the pendency of an action or relating to 
the same judgment’ (Rushing 2007).  In essence, one must engage in a great deal of 
genuinely harmful, specious litigation before being denied access to the courts. 
The vexatious litigant designation and associated penalty is analogous to the 
sanction I suggest when denying epistemic nihilists a platform.  My suggestion is not that 
we should liberally deny a platform at the first instance of nihilism or that no other steps 
be taken, but rather that extreme measures are justifiable in extreme circumstances.  If there 
are individuals who cannot be trusted to engage in good faith, their refusal to do so poses 
significant harm, and less strenuous efforts have not proved corrective, we should be 
willing to deny them a platform. 
 
Conclusion 
Epistemic nihilism is all too common in contemporary discourse, in part because of the 
advantage it affords.  While there are particularly obvious offenders whose speech 
regularly serves as a paradigm for nihilistic speech, like Donald Trump, it seems unlikely 
that one electoral defeat or one individual receding into the background of public life will 
address the wider problem of epistemic nihilism as a phenomenon.  As research into the 
phenomena that constitute epistemic nihilism clearly demonstrates, Trump is not sui 
 
12 Anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statutes are intended to prevent litigants 
from filing lawsuits specifically designed to discourage public access to the courts by, for example, 
making participation so expensive as to be prohibitive.  For example, a corporation may engage in 
SLAPP if they file a lawsuit against a critic they expect to lose, but the costs of defending oneself from 
the lawsuit would bankrupt the critic.  Such suits incentivize not speaking out, even when making 
legally protected claims, by making the price of participation too high (Randazza 2012). 
generis.  There were epistemic nihilists before Trump, and there will be epistemic nihilists 
after Trump.  If anything, Trump’s success during his campaign and administration 
highlights the need for heightened vigilance so that the mistakes that led to the success of 
his nihilism will not be repeated. 
While there are many steps one might take to discourage such nihilism, I have 
argued that, in extreme cases, we ought to simply deny the nihilist a platform from which 
to speak.  Such sanction would apply only to egregious offenders whose nihilism is not 
only dangerous, but has not been corrected by more taciturn measures.  While some 
platforms have taken steps to ban anonymous nihilists, such efforts do not seem to have 
extended regularly to more widely known offenders.  Furthermore, when such 
deplatforming does occur, it is not only the exception to the rule, but it is also predicated 
on other behavior like abuse or sockpuppeting.  Conspiracist Alex Jones, for example, has 
repeatedly suggested that the 2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary was staged, 
but was banned from Twitter for abusive behavior towards other users (Schneider 2018).  
Similarly, the Krassenstein brothers, known mostly for hyperbolic criticism of Trump, 
were banned for maintaining multiple accounts under the guise that they were operated by 
different individuals, as well as purchasing interactions in order to publicize their 
antagonism of Trump (Concha 2019).   
Clearly, the discussion here leaves many further questions to be answered, like what 
precisely constitutes an ‘extreme’ case or the precise circumstances in which we ought to 
deny nihilists a platform?  But these, I think, represent fruitful avenues of future 
deliberation.  Regardless of the specifics generated by such discussion, if we are to take 
the fight against epistemic nihilism seriously, we must be willing to not only take effective 
measures against nihilists and nihilistic speech, but also to apply those measures evenly, 
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